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FORENSIC SCIENCE
EXPERT QUALIFICATIONS: TRAPS FOR THE
UNWARY
Paul C. Giannelli*

Introduction
The importance of expert testimony in criminal practice cannot be
overstated. One study reported: ''About one quarter of the citizens who had
served on juries which were presented with scientific evidence believed that
had such evidence been absent, they would have changed their verdicts
from guilty to not guilty.' '1 Of coirrse, the quality of the expert testimony
received at trial depends almost entirely on the quality of the witnesses who
testify as experts. This article examines some of the pitfalls associated with
the qualifications of expert witnesses.

Federal Rule 702
Federal Evidence Rule 702 provides that a witness may qualify as an
expert by reason of ''lmowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.' '2
Rule 104(a) entrusts the trial judge with determining the qualifications of
experts3 and that decision is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.4
Dean Wigmore wrote that the witness's expertise "may have been attained,
so far as legal rules go, in any way whatever; all the law requires is that it
*Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University. This article is based in part on P. Giannelli & E. Im
winkelried, Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 1999). Reprinted with permission.
_
1 Peterson, Ryan, Boulden & Mihajlovic, "The Use and Effects of Forensic Sci
ence in the Adjudication of Felony Cases," 32 J. Forensic Sci. 1730, 1748 (1987).

2 Fed. R. Evid. 702: "If scientific, teclmical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa
tion, may testify thereto in the form· of an opinion or otherwise.''

3 Fed. R. Evid. 104(a): ''Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a

person to be a witness . . . shall be determined by the court . . . .

''

4 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 ( 1974) ("[T]he District Court
has wide discretion in its determination to admit and exclude evidence, and this is
'
particularly true in the case of expert testimony. " ); Salem v. United States Lines
Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 ( 1962) ("The trial judge has broad discretion in the matter of
the admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and his action is to be sustained un
less manifestly enoneous.' ').
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should have been attained.' '5 The federal drafters expressed it this way:
''[T]he expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by
'lmowledge, skill, experience, training or education.' Thus within the scope
of the mle are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physi
cians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called
'skilled' witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values.' '6

A number of basic points are not in dispute. First, because ''the rule uses

the disjunctive, a person may qualify to render expert testimony in any one
of the five ways listed: lmowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.' '7
In other words, the '' [ q]ualifications which may satisfy the requirements of
Evid. R. 702 are multitudinous.. . . [T]here is no 'degree' requirement, per
se. Professional experience and traitling in a particular field may be sufficient
to qualify one as an expert.' '8
Second, an expert need not be an ''outstanding practitioner in the field in
which he professes expertise. "9 Indeed, an "expe1i need not have certifi
cates of training, nor memberships in professional organizations . . . . ''10
Third, comparable qualifications between experts testifying on the same
issue are not required: "[O]ne expert need not hold the exact same set of
qualifications to rebut another expert's testimony. . . . Thjs Cm.ui need not
analyze, as Defendant contends it should, whether a psychologist or psyct.ti
atrist is more qualified to testify as to the psychological condition of a patient
at the tin1e of the offense.' 'll If a battle of the experts develops, '' [c]ompari
sons between [an expert's] professional stature and the stah1re of witnesses
for an opposing party may be made by the jury . . . . But the only question
for the trial judge who must decide whether or not to allow the jury to
consider a proffered expert's opinions is, 'whether his lmowledge of the
subject matter is such that his opinion will most likely assist the trier of fact
in arriving at the truth.'''12
Fourth, an expert's qualifications should be based on the nature and
extent of the witness's lmowledge and not on the witness's "title." In Jen
ldns v. United States13 the D.C. Circuit reversed a trial court's ruling that

psychologists were not qualified to testify on the issue of i.Ttsanity because

they lacked medical training. '' [W]e must examine the reality behind the

52 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 556, at 75 1 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
6 Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note.
7 Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1993).
8 State v. Mack, 653 N.E.2d 329, 337 (Ohio 1995), ce1i. denied, 516 U.S. 1096

( 1996).
9 United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 10 13, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977) .
Jo

Id.
United States v. Madoch, 935 F. Supp. 965, 972 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
12 United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 10 13, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977).
13 307 F.2d 637, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

11
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title 'psychologist.' ' ' On one hand, many psychologists would not be quali
fe
i d to express an opinion on insanity because their ''traiilg
ln and experience
may not provide an adequate basis for their testimony. ' ' 14 On the other hand,
other psychologists, because of their training and experience in the diagnosis
and treatment of mental disorders, may be qualified.51
Criminals as Experts
An interesting example of experience as a qualification for expert
testimony involves the use of criminals. For example, in United States v.
Johnson16 an experienced marijuana smoker was permitted to testify that
certain marijuana came from Colombia; the witness ''had smoked marijuana
over a thousand times . . . . He based his identification upon the plant 's ap
pearance, its leaf, buds, stems, and other physical characteristics, as well as
upon the smell and the effect of smoking it. ' '17 In United States v. Williams18
the witness testified about a street gang 's drug code.19 The court wrote:
"There was no pretense that he was impartial, or a member of a learned
profession.Neither condition is required to qualify a person as an expert wit
ness under the current rules of evidence . . . . There is-'not even a paradox
in the suggestion that the biggest experts on crime are, often, criminals. ' '20

Declaring a Witness an Expert
In contrast to existing practice, the Kentucky Supreme Court has taken
the position that the trial judge should not declare the witness an expert in
the presence of the jury. In Luttrell v. Commonwealth 21 the court stated:
''Great care should be exercised by a trial judge when the determination has
been made that the witness is an expert.If the jury is so informed such a
conclusion obviously enhances the credibility of that witness in the eyes of
the jury.All such rulings should be made outside the hearing of the jury and
there should be no declaration that the witness is an expert. ' '22

Stipulations

Frequently, opposing counsel offers to stipulate to the qualifications of
41 ld.
15 Id.
16 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979).

71 Id. at 1360.
18 81 F.3d 1434 (7th Cir. 1996),cert. denied,522 U.S. 1062 (1998).
91 Id. at 1442 ("You don't have to be a scientist or use the methodology

of sci

ence, or even be an honest, decent,law-abiding citizen, in order to possess special
ized 1m owledge about a criminal activity.'').
20

Id. at 1441.

21 952 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1997).
22 ld. at 218.
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an expert These offers are often rejected because the stipulation deprives the
jury of information that makes the expert's opinion more persuasive. In
State

v.

Colwell23 the trial court required the defense counsel to accept the

prosecution's offer to stipulate to the qualifications of the defense patholo
gist. Consequently, the jury was deprived of learning the credentials of the
expert, who had a "national reputation" in the :field of forensic pathology. In
contrast, eleven pages of the transcript \Vere needed to record the qualifica
tions of the prosecution's expert. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed: ''We
conclude that an offer by the State to stipulate to the qualifications of an
expert witness called by the defendant is merely an offer unless accepted by
the defendant. Absent such acceptance, the defendant has the right to present
the witness' qualifications to the jury.' '24

Although some professions require licensing by the state, licensing in a
:field is usually not detenninative in qualifying a witness as an expert-but
this may be changing. In People

v.

Wesf5 an Illinois appellate corui held that

a witness not licensed to investigate fires lli.J.der a state statute was not quali
fied to testifY about the cause of a fire in a..n arson prosecution. Si...-·nilarly, i..1
Soliz v. State2r. a Texas appellate court mled a police officer unqualified as an

hypnotist under a statute that prohibited hypnotic interviews by the police
unless the officer had completed a training course approved by a state com
mission and passed an examination designed to test the officer's lmowledge
of investigative hypnosis.

Certification by a professional peer group may also be a trend in the
future.27 There are a number of forensic science organizations that certifY its
members, and this is an important development. It is not, however, without
problems. One of the factors cited by the United States Supreme Court in its
"junk science" case, Daubert v. lvferrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,28 was
the ''existence and maintenance of standards'' in a field. The Daubert Comi
cited United States v. Williams,29 a voiceprint case, on this point. In Williams
the Second Circuit cited the certification procedures of the 1J.temational As-

23 790 P.2d 430 (Kan. 1990).
2.1

Id. at 434.

25 636 N.E.2d 1239, 1245 ( Ill. App 1994).

26

961 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex. App. 1997) (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann.
§ 415.036(a) (Vernon 1990)).
27 See questioned documents cases at notes 52-54 and accompanying texts.
28 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
29 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d CiT. 1978), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).

252

FORENSICS: EXPERT -QUALIFICATIONS TRAPS

sociation ofVoice Identification.30 The problem with the Supreme Court 's
citation of Williams is that a National Academy of Sciences report on
voiceprints concluded that this was not a scientifc
i group; this Association
"as presently constituted does not possess the broad base of representation
usually considered appropriate and perhaps essential for a national certifYing
board. ' '3 1 This group was composed of law enforcement officers who were
trained to do voice identifications. Only one person in the group, Dr.Tosi,
who conducted the initial voiceprint experi ments at Michigan State
University, was a scientist.
Moreover, the certific ation procedures should be scrutinized. For
example, an article in The Wall Street Journal, entitled "The Making of an
Expert Witness: It's in the Credentials," discusses the American College of
Forensic Examiners (ACFE), which makes $2.2 ?lillian a year certifying
experts.32 The roots of this organization, accordiii.g to its founder, can be
traced to the Daubert decision, which (paradoxically) was intended to tighten
the standards for expert testimony. This organization appears to be a
"certification" mill. It cost $350 to get certified-just diall-800-4A-Expert.
Professor Carol Henderson applied the term "checkbo,ok credentials" to
this type of certification procedure.33 Nevertheless, the '' A CFE is the biggest
credentialing body in forensic science and the only one that credentials
experts in many specialties. It has 13,000 members and nearly 17,000 board
certified diplomates.' '34
Brewer v. State,S5 a bite-mark case, raised a different issue.In that case,
the defense challenged the qualifications of Dr. Michael West because he
had been suspended by the American Board of Forensic Odontology and had
resigned from the International Association of Identifc
i ation and the Ameri
can Academy of Forensic Sciences while under investigation. The court
rejected the challenge, pointing out that West 's "fiasco" in a prior case
involved his ''blue light ' ' technique, through which he claimed to be able to
perfectly match a bruise on an accused 's palm with the murder weapon.36
Moreover, West had testified in seven cases after his suspension, and the
defense expert conceded that West was quali fie d and that his direct
comparison technique was an acceptable method.37
·

30 See Giannelli, "Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence," 15 Car
dozo L. Rev. 1999 (1994).
3 1 National Research Council,On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identification
65 (1979).

32 MacDonald, "The Making of an Expert Witness: It's in the Credentials," Wall
StreetJ., Feb. 8,1999, at Bl.
33

Hansen, ''Expertise to Go,'' 86 ABAJ. 44, 45 (Feb. 2000).

34

Id. at 46.

35 725

So.

2d 106 (Miss. 1998),cert. denied,119 S. Ct. 1270 (1999).

36

See Giannelli, ''The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories," 4 Va. J. L. & Soc. Policy 439,454-55
(1997) (discussing the blue-light technique).

37 725 So. 2d at 125-26.
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In a surprising number of cases experts have lied about their credentials.38
For example, in one case a serologist testified that he had a master's degree
in science, ''whereas in fact he never attained a graduate degree.' '39 In an

other case the death penalty was vacated when it was discovered that a pros

ecution expert, who ''had testified in many cases,'' had lied about her profes

sional qualifications: ''she had never fulfilled the educational requirements
for a laboratory technician.' '40 Moreover, a psychologist was convicted of

perjury for claiming he had a doctorate during the Ted Bundy trialY Other

cases are listed in the margin.42

Professor Starrs has written comprehensively on this topic, noting that

one firearms expert took some credit for ''the development of penicillin, the

'Pap' smear, and to top it all off, the atomic bomb.' '·l3 Professor Sales insight

fuiiy asks: "But if people are willing to lie about something [credentials] on

which it is so easy to be caught, how common and how damaging to the fact
finding process are misrepresentations about the substance of forensic sci

ence: fabrication of fi n dings, exaggeration of findings, withholding of

exculpatory findings, and other lrnowing attempts to create in the fact finder

an impression that is not supported by the scientific evidence?' '44

In a recent case in Cleveland, a thief and forger testified as a questioned

documents examiner. \J\fhen his background was revealed by a newspaper

reporter, he was charged and convicted of peljUl)' because he had lied about
his credentials. When the lawyer who caHed tllis vritness was questioned by

the press, he reportedly stated: "It's not my job to check out people's
credentials.' '45 But if it is not the attorney's responsibility, whose is it?

38 See generally American Academy of Forensic Sciences, By Laws, art. II (code
of ethics and conduct) (''Every member of the AAFS shall refrain from providing
any material misrepresentation of education, training, experience or area of
expertise.'').

39 Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 460 (D.C. App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
I037 (198I).
.Jo Co nm10nwealth v. Mount, 257 A.2d 578, 579 (Pa. 1969).
·n Kline v. State, 444 So.2d II02 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984).
·l2
E.g., Maddox v. Lord, 8I8 F.2d 1058, I062 (2d Cir. 1987) (serologist testified
falsely about his academic credentials); People v. Alfano, 420 N.E.2d 1I14, 11I6
(Ill. App. I983) (arson expert testifei d falsely about his academic credentials); State
v. Elder, 433 P.2d 462 ( Kan. I967) (lab technician convicted of perjury for
misrepresenting his educational background); State v. DeFronzo, 394 N.E.2d I027,
I 030 (Ohio C.P. 1978) (lab analyst pleaded guilty to 8 counts of falsification for
misstating his academic credentials).
'l3 Starrs, "Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists," in 2 Forensic Science
Handbook I, 7, 20-29 (R. Saferstein ed. I988).
'j4 Sales, "Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science," 34
Forensic Sci. 772, 789 (1989) (listing other cases).

J.

45 Ewinger, "Thief, forger key witness for ex-boss of CMHA," Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Sept. 25, 1999.
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lack of Valid Experience
It was once shocking,, but now commonplace, to :find experts who are
totally unqualified to testify. Some courts seem to follow the old trial
lawyer's adage: "If the witness comes from out-of-town and carries an at
tache case, the witness is an expert." For instance, a study of drug testing
laboratories in the 1970s discovered the following drug "expert," who had

43 years of experience and more than 2500 court appearances: ''[The expert]
admitted that not only did he not have a college degree, but that he had never
even finished high school. He claimed that heroin was an alkaloid, which it
is, but did not remember what an alkaloid was; He could not draw the
structure of heroin or benzene, one of the commqnest and simplest organic
molecules. . . . In addition, he could not explain any single chemical reac
tion about which he had testified.' '46
Another example involved neutron activation analysis (NAA). In Ward
v. State47 the prosecution expert was employed by a city crime laboratory.

Ail important article on NAA questioned whether this person would have the
proper qualifications in nuclear physics and analytical chemistry necessary
to conduct this type of analysis.48 Also, the qualifications necessary to
conduct NAA differ from the qualifications needed to interpret the results;
the "qualifications of the expert as an analytical chemist do not necessarily
establish

his

competence

to

interpret

the

legal

relevance

of

his

measurements.' '49
In State v. Barnes50 the testimony of a defense expert concerning a pellet
dispersion pattern test was excluded because the expert was not qualified. He
''became a gunsmith after completing a correspondence course. He had
never received training in forensic science, firearms identification or bal
listics. He had never testified as an expert in any area. He worked as a sales
clerk at a hardware store and in his own gun repair business.' '51

Cases involving questioned documents examiners also illustrate this
point. In United States v. Bourgeois,52 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals up
held a trial court's exclusion of the testimony of an "expert" who was not a
member of the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners, who
practiced graphotherapy in addition to handwriting comparison, and who
acquired a masters degree in graphoanalysis and a Ph.D. in metaphysics and
46 Stein, Laessig & Indriksons,"An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used
by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their Analysts," 1973 Wis. L.
Rev. 727,728.

47 427 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
48 Comment, "The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis," 59 Cal.
L. Rev. 997, 1036 n.216 (1971).

49 Id. at 1031.
50 597 So. 2d 1109 (La. App. 1992).
51 Id. at 1112.
52 950 F.2d 980, 986 (5th Cir. 1992).
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religion by correspondence. Although other cases are in accord,53 there are
some noteworthy exceptions. Indeed, one dissenting judge stated in
exasperation: ''If this witness has indeed testified over 3 00 times as an experi
on discoveling spulious handwliting as she claimed, it is an astonishing
indictment on the gullibility of lawyers and judges.''54
Perhaps the best (worst?) examples involve hypnosis ''expe1is.'' In one
Wyoming case,55 even the prosecutor had difficult-y stating his expert's
qualifications. The majority heid that the hypnotist did not need any
qualifications. The dissent replied:
It follows, therefore, that a hobo passing through town or a derelict in
the county jail could hypnotize a potential witness, and the witness'
testimony would be admissible at trial . . . . There is a man in Oakland,
California, who is the dean and lone "professor" at "Croaker College."
For the sum of

$150

each, this man trains frogs to jump

. .

.

.

As part of

his rigid training curriculum, the ·"professor" claims that he hypnotizes
the frog; while they are in their hypnotic trance, he plays an attitude
improvement tape to them. Under our present standards the dean of
"Croaker College" would be over-qualified as a hypnotist.56

In a subsequent case, the majority described a hypnotist as a ''non
professional with meager training in hypnotic techniques.''57 From the dis
sent we learn that the "meager training" was a 32-hour home comse; the
hypnotist was also a maintenance man at Pacific Power and Light Company.58
The janitor?
53 E.g., State v. Livanos, 725 P.2d 505, 507 (Ariz. App. 1986) (The record re
vealed that "he had never testified in a superior court in Arizona, that the last time
he had testified in a superior court was in Indiana in 1969, that he belonged to an or
ganization called World Association of Document Examiners, . . . whose admis
sions procedures were very infonnal, but that he was not certified by the American
Board of Forensic Document Examiners."); Carroll v. State, 634 S.W.2d 99, 102
(Ark. 1982) ("He had taken a correspondence course from the Intemational Gra
phoanalysis Society of Chicago, which had certified him. . . . In his twelve years of
alleged experience 'in questioned document work' he had testified as an expert only
once, in Clinton, Iowa, and had 'worked with' law enforcement officers in two
Arkansas counties, but the cases did not come to trial. . . . He was not a member of
the Academy of Forensic Sciences."); People v. Tidwell, 706 P.2d 438, 439 (Colo.
App. 1985) (excluding testimony of a graphoanalyst because not certified by Amer
ican Board of Document Examiners); Gaves v. State, 547 N.E.2d 881, 882 (Ind.
App. 1989) ("The witness testified she was a graphoanalyst, a graduate of the
International Graphoanalysis School in Chicago, a member of the International Gra
phoanalysis Society and the World Association of Document Examiners, and had
previously testified as an expert on four occasions.'').
54 Hooten v. State, 492 So. 2d 948, 958 (Miss. 1986) (dissenting opinion).
55

Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983).
56 Id. at 105-06, 106 n. 3.
57 Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280, 283 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1098 (1987).
58 Jd. at 289 n. 1.
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Testifying Beyond Expertise

One of the most common problems concerns experts who testifY beyond
their expertise. As Professor Maguire noted a half century ago, "It goes
without saying that an expert qualified to testifY upon one topic may be
completely unqualified to testifY about another as to which he lacks special
knowledge, skill, experience, or training, but some applications of this
principle take the unwary by surprise.' '59 There is no shortage of examples.
A series of bite-mark cases illustrate this point.In State v. Garrison60 the
expert was permitted to state his conclusion in terms of probability theory,
testifYing that "there is an eight in one million probability that the teeth
marks found on the deceased's breast were not made by appellant."61 Such a
statement appears to be without scientific foundation. The expert did not
perform any of his own mathematical calculations, was unaware of the
formula used to arrive at that fg
i ure other than that it was "computerized,"
and was ignorant of the statistical weight assigned to each variable used iil
the equation.62 The dissent commented: ''[W]hile Dr.Campbell may have a
great deal of expertise in the actual comparison techniques of bite-mark
identification, he is totally out of his field when the discussion turns to prob
ability theory. "63
L'1 Commonwealth v. Henry64 the expert went beyond a compa..rison and
characterized a bite mark as "sadistic" rather than a "sexual" or "fighting"
mark.In his view, the "essence of the distinction is that fighting bite marks
are less well defined because they are done carelessly and quickly, whereas
attacking and sadistic bite marks are made slowly and produce a clearer
pattern. ' '65 According to the expert, ''the sadistic bite mark is one of the
most well defined.Sexual bite marks are also well defined, but usually have
59 Maguire, Evidence: Common Law and Common Law 30-31 (1947).
60 585 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1978).
61 Id. at 566.
62 "As indicated in the majority opinion, Dr. Campbell was unsure as to precisely
where he obtained the figure 'eight in one million.' My independent research reveals
that of the two treatises which he could name as containing statistical information,
only . . . [one] lists any figures on the uniqueness of a bite-mark. Rather than the
eight in one million figure vouched for by Dr. Campell, though, that treatise . . .
contains the figure eight in one hundred thousand." I d. at 568-69. "Moreover, the
applicability of even an eight in one hundred thousand figure to the defendant is
dubious." Id. at 569 n. l .

63 Id. at 568. See also McCord, ''A Primer For the Nonmathematically Inclined
on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond," 47
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 741, 801 (1990) ("A blistering and convincing dissent [in
Garrison] showed the probability to be without foundation and thus unfairly
prejudicial.'').

64 569 A.2d 929 (Pa. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
65

Id. at 934.
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a red center, produced by sucking tissue into the mouth.' '66 The testimony
characterizing the mark as a "sadistic" mark was relevant on the issue of
whether the homicide was committed by means of torture. It seems doubtful
that a bite mark can be characterized as ''sexual'' or ''fighting'' by an exam
ination of the mark alone. Sunounding circumstances, including an autopsy,
may pennit such a characterization.

One illustration of an expert testifying beyond his expertise arises with
technicians. Courts must "differentiate between ability to operate an instru
ment or perform a test and the ability to make an interpretation drawn from
use of the instrument' '67 For example, ''an officer may administer a breath

test even though he is not otherwise q,ualified to interpret the results.' '68

Similarly, in a case involving the horizontal gaze nystagmus test for
intoxication, one cou..rt remarked: "[The officer's] opinion that appellant was
tmder the influence of alcohol, to the extent it was based on the nystagmus
test, rests on scientific premises well beyond his knowledge, training, or
education. Without some understanding of the processes by which alcohol
ingestion produces nystagmus, how strong the correlation is, how other pos
sible callses might be 1naslced, what margin of etTor has been shovvn in
statistical surveys, and a host of other relevant factors, [the officer's] opinion
on causation, noP.vithstanding his ability to recognize the symptom, was
unfounded.' '69

A different issue arises when the testifying expert is qualified (perhaps

eminently so) but the witness did not conduct the actual examination. In
short, the wrong expert is on the witness stand. For instance, in Reardon v.
Manson70 a toxicologist testified about the identity of a seized substance

(marijuana) based on tests perfonned by chemists working under his supervi
sion. The Second Circuit upheld the practice: ''Expe1i reliance upon the
output of others does not necessmily violate the confrontation clause where
the expert is available for questioning concerning the nature and reasonable-

66 Id.
67 People

v.

68 French

v.

King, 72 CaL Rpt. 478, 491 (CaL App. 1968).
State, 484 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Accord State v.
James, 428 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ohio App. 1980) (state trooper qualified as an expert
in the operation of intoxilyzer but did not possess sufficient learning and knowledge
about effects of alcohol consumption); State v. Priester, 391 S.E.2d 227, 228 ( S.C.
1990) (lab toxicologist not qualified to testify about the effect of alcohol on the
brain).
v. Williams, 5 CaL Rpt. 2d 130, 135 (CaL App. 1992).
806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986), ceri. denied, 481 U.S. 1020 (1987).

69 People
io
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ness of his reliance. . . . This is particularly true where the defendants have
access to the same sources of information through subpoena or otherwise.' '71
The court, however, passed over a significant problem. In 1983 Sales and
Duizend published a study on the use of scientific evidence. Part of their
investigation involved case studies of different forensic techniques. The drug
case in their study is the Reardon prosecution. They commented: "In this
case, the laboratory in question had three doctorate-level toxicologists and
twenty-two or twenty-four less-credentialed chemists. The volume of tests
performed (about 20,000 annually) left the toxicologist an average of only a
few minutes per day to attend to any given test. Is this adequate involvement
to justify testifying to the :findings?"72 In other words, the toxicologist was
"supervising" fifty cases a day. As the district judge had discerned: "[I]t
strains credulity to assert that Dr. Reading could personally 'supervise' some
fifty of these tests daily. "73

lay Testimony Distinguished
There is sometimes an overlap between lay and expe1t testimony.74 Both
lay and expert witnesses, for example, are permitted to state opinions
concerning handwriting and sanity.75 One court even permitted lay witnesses
to respond to hypothetical questions.76 There is, however, an important dif
ference between t.hese two types of opinions: ''[T]he lay witness is using his
opinion as a composite expression of his observations otherwise difficult to
state, whereas the expert is expressing his scientific knowledge through his
opinions.' '77 The Fifth Circuit put it this way:
Unlike expert opinion, where the opinion is the product of applying
special skill in some art, trade, or profession acquired apart from the case,
lay opinion expresses a conclusion drawn from observations in circum
stances where it is impractical, if possible at all, to recount the observed
"factual" components of the opinion. The common illustrations are an
expression of opinion by a lay observer of a car's speed or a person's
expression or emotional state (he was furious). Because these opinions
draw upon the facts in the case itself, they are more easily confronted

71 ld. at 42.
72 Sales & Van Duizend, The Use ofScientific Evidence in Litigation 49 (1983).
73 Reardon v. Manson, 617 F. Supp. 932, 936 (D. Conn. 1985).
74 Fed. R. Evid. 701: "If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness'
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or infer
ences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue. "

75 The better tenninology is lay and expert "testimony" rather than "witnesses"
because one witness may be both a "fact " witness and an expert witness.
76 See United States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (1st Cir. 1983) (investors
permitted to answer a number of hypothetical questions to establish that they would
not have invested but for the representations made; not being asked as experts).
77 Ladd, "Expert Testimony," 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414,419 (1952).
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than are expert opinion, whose source is often extraneous to the case at
trial. As such, receipt of lay opinion is much less likely to be prejudicial,
especially where its role is cumulative and is not essential to the suffi
ciency of the evidence, as here. 78

In some cases lay witnesses cross the line and testify about matters that
require expertise.79 In other cases, the line between lay and expert testimony
becomes blurred. Indeed, the First Circuit has commented: ''No longer is lay
opinion testimony limited to areas within the common knowledge of
ordinary persons. Rather, the individual experience and lmowledge of a lay
witness may establish his or her competence, without qualification as an
expert, to express an opinion on a particular subject outside the realm of
common lmowledge.' '80 In contrast, other courts lament this development:
'' [W]ith each new trial day the government pushed to squeeze as much as
possible from this 'lay witness.' The result is clear, certainly now, that dur
ing [the witness's] two-and-half days. on the stand, he wielded his expertise

as a bank examiner in a way that is incompatible with a lay witness.' '81

The distinction between lay and expert testimony shoUld be maintained.
As the Supreme Court noted in Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichae/,82 the evi
dentiary rationale underlying Rule 702 is that the Federal Rules grant experts
special latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the assumption that expert
testimony has a reliable basis. A proposed· amendment to Federal Rule 701,
which governs lay opinion testimony, would add language to clarify this
distinction.83
Moreover, the distinction between lay and expert testimony is critical in
applying other rules. For instance, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(a)( l )(E) requires pretrial disclosure of a summary of an expert's
testimony. Classification of the evidence as lay opinion denies the adverse
party the benefit of this rule. As one court has remarked, the prosecution
should not ''subvert'' the expert discovery rule by offering expert opinion on
78 United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 949 (1987).
79 E.g., State v. Flaherty, 605 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (Ohio App.) ("The average po
lice officer is not sufficiently versed in psychology to render an opinion that a given
individual' s reaction to stress is normal or abnormal, especially a person as emotion
ally complex as appellant appears to be"; testifYing on whether defendant cried the
moming of the murder), app. dismissed, 596 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio 1992)..

80 United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989).
81 United States v. Riddle, 103 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1997).
82 526 U.S. 137 (1999) ("Rules 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses testimonial
latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the 'assumption that the expert's opinion
will have a reliable basis . . . . " ) .
'

83 Fed. R. Evid. 701 (1998 proposed amendment adding a third requirement
"(c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge."). The cur
rent rule can be found in note 74 supra.
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drug trafficking as lay opinion testimony.84 In addition, Federal Rule 704(b)
prohibits testimony on ultimate �ssues concerning an accused's mental condi
tion in criminal cases; this provision does not apply to lay witnesses.
Conclusion

The issues examined in this article are not new. Over a century ago, the
Minnesota Supreme Court observed that "[t]here is hardly anything, not
palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be proved by some so-called
'experts." '85 More recently, a federal judge stated that "experts whose
opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a
court of law'' and it ''is time to take hold of expert testimony in federal
trials.' '86
84 United States

v.

Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1131 (1998).

85 Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn.1899).
86 In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
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